Texas A&M University

Policy + Technology = Security By Gene Charleton

Nuclear energy brings with it a risk that nuclear fuel and nuclear capabilities could be used to produce nuclear or radiological weapons. Ensuring that nuclear energy is used peacefully is the task of the nonproliferation expert. Diplomats get the spotlight in nonproliferation. But engineers and scientists can play an important role, too.

Dr. William S. Charlton
William S. Charlton, associate professor in the Department of Nuclear Engineering, says combining technology and policy development can lead to better defenses against nuclear proliferation.

Bill Charlton is a nuclear engineer, not a diplomat.

A diplomat would never talk so straightforwardly about a treaty the United States didn’t sign. But Charlton is as committed as any diplomat to solving an international issue that has vexed world powers for more than a half-century — proliferation of nuclear and radiological weapons.

“The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was a flawed treaty,” he says. “The U.S. works within the Comprehensive Test Ban framework, but we are not signatories to the treaty.

“On the political side, it made sense and we agreed with it. But at the time the treaty was signed, there was no way to verify compliance with it. Thus, there was no way for us to say that no one was cheating on it.”

Changing that is one of the goals of a new Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI) that Charlton helped found and heads. In the past, most efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear and radiological weapons moved along separate paths, one policy oriented; one technology oriented. This practice led to situations like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty — a good idea without the tools to make it work reliably.

“One of our goals in this institute is to work with our partners (such as the Bush School) to try to help fix those sorts of problems so that for any treaty that gets signed, there is a technological basis for how we can verify that treaty and maintain it,” Charlton says.

Major funding for NSSPI’s activities so far has come from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, the unit that oversees DOE’s nonproliferation programs.

Nuclear lie detectors?

“One of our goals in this institute is to work with our partners (such as the Bush School) to try to help fix those sorts of problems so that for any treaty that gets signed, there is a technological basis for how we can verify that treaty and maintain it,” Charlton says.

If verifying that nobody is cheating on treaties is the big issue in nuclear and radiological nonproliferation, figuring out how to make that work is a big part of what NSSPI was intended to do. Charlton says he considers the institute’s biggest strength the ability to bring together the policy development part of nonproliferation with the ability to develop the technology needed to make verification reliable.

Nonproliferation technologies that NSSPI researchers are working on include

  • procedures and detection capabilities to safeguard nuclear reactor fuel;
  • methods and technology to determine the source of nuclear or radiological material used in a terrorist attack (such as the reactor that produced the spent fuel used in a dirty bomb); and
  • more sensitive and accurate interrogation devices to detect radioactive materials at ports of entry.

The institute’s partners — the University of California, Berkeley; the University of New Mexico; and the Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories — bring a variety of research and policy-development strengths.

“They’ve all been extremely excited about the prospect of this institute and working with us,” Charlton says. “We have identified various research areas that we can work in with those different entities to help forward the state of knowledge in this arena.”

The nuclear schoolhouse

But nonproliferation research isn’t all the institute’s faculty is interested in. Education — both technical education for researchers at the national laboratories and more general education in nonproliferation issues for university students — is a big part of the institute’s mission.

“We plan to get out into high schools, to go to other areas of Texas and small group settings, professors in front of a class, to be able to explain to them what is nuclear science, what is nuclear nonproliferation, what are the issues we have to deal with in the way of radiological weapons,” he says.

Charlton has conducted nonproliferation-related short courses for researchers at national laboratories and has participated in DOE-sponsored activities aimed at helping nuclear weapons scientists in other countries convert weapons programs to peaceful uses, such as medical isotope production. Last year, he visited Libya as a member of a joint DOE team that consulted with Libyan nuclear scientists after the Libyan government formally renounced weapons of mass destruction.

NSSPI also is working with nuclear scientists in Egypt, Mexico and Morocco on nonproliferation issues. Algeria is expected to sign on soon. Institute scientists also are working with DOE to develop research programs analyzing India and China.

Another ambitious educational undertaking is the joint development of master’s-level degree programs in nonproliferation at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPHI) and the Obninsk Institute of Nuclear Power Engineering in Russia (Russian Academic Program in Nuclear Nonproliferation and International Security) and in Texas A&M’s nuclear engineering department. The new programs will hold their first classes in Fall 2006.

“Finding ways that work to block the proliferation of nuclear and radiological weapons will only become more important as nuclear power becomes more important to worldwide energy production.”end of story

Nuclear vs. Radiological

One of the most widely discussed issues in nonproliferation is keeping terrorists from getting their hands on nuclear or radiological weapons. There’s a big difference between them, and it’s important, Charlton says.

Nuclear weapons use nuclear fission — the splitting of atomic nuclei — to produce huge amounts of energy. Their destructiveness ranges from the equivalent of several thousand tons of TNT to several million.

Radiological weapons — “dirty bombs” — use conventional explosives to scatter powdered radioactive material over the area around the bomb’s explosion. Dirty bombs’ actual destructive power is minuscule, and unless you’re very near one when it goes off, they pose little real threat. Their real impact is fear and confusion.

“They’re weapons of mass disruption, not mass destruction,” Charlton says. end of story